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THE JUDICIAL DISABLING OF THE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT*
By Charles B. Craver**
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was signed into law by
then President George Bush.1 The ADA constitutes the most extensive disability civil rights law
ever enacted.2 It provides extensive protection against various types of discrimination for
individuals with serious physical and mental disabilities. At the official signing ceremony,
President Bush described the ADA as “the world’s first comprehensive declaration of equality
for people with disabilities.”3
The primary impetus for the ADA was the historic societal discrimination against
individuals with disabilities. Congress acknowledged that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one
or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a
whole is growing older.”4 Congress further stated that “historically, society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, . . . such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”5
Two-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64
are not working at all; yet, a large majority of those not working
say that they want to work. Sixty-six percent of working-age
disabled persons, who are not working, say that they would like to
have a job. Translated into absolute terms, this means that about
8.2 million people with disabilities want to work but cannot find a
job.6
In addition, Congress recognized that disabled persons constitute a “discrete and insular minority
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who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society . . .”7
People with disabilities occupy inferior positions socially and economically. They are much
poorer and less well educated than non-disabled persons.8 Congress further realized that public
fears, misperceptions, and ignorant stereotypes regarding the disabled were so commonplace that
societal discrimination adversely affected many people who were not truly disabled.9 Congress
thus decided to extend statutory protection not only to persons with actual disabilities, but also to
individuals with records of prior disabilities who are no longer significantly inhibited by their
previous conditions and persons who are regarded by others as being disabled even when they are
not.10
Although other sections of the ADA proscribe discrimination with respect to such areas
as public transportation11 and public accommodations,12 Title I expressly prohibits discrimination
against disabled individuals in employment.13 When it was enacted, disability rights advocates
hoped this new statute would provide disabled persons with expansive protection against various
forms of employment discrimination. Their expectations have unfortunately not been realized. A
series of recent Supreme Court decisions have narrowed the scope of ADA coverage to severely
limit statutory protection to individuals with relatively severe disabilities.
This article will explore the propriety of the Supreme Court’s ADA decisions concerning
their impact on employment discrimination coverage. It will suggest alternative approaches that
would be more consistent with both the express statutory provisions and the underlying
legislative intent. Part II will review the basic scope of ADA employment discrimination
coverage. Part III will then evaluate the way in which Supreme Court decisions have defined and
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restricted ADA coverage. In Part IV, I will indicate how I think the Supreme Court should
interpret the applicable ADA provisions.

II. SCOPE OF ADA EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COVERAGE
The employment discrimination provisions of the ADA cover employers with fifteen or
more regular employees, employment agencies, and labor organizations.14 No regulated entity
“shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.”15 Covered parties are required to make “reasonable accommodations” for known
physical or mental limitations that will enable disabled persons to perform the essential functions
of jobs, where such accommodations can be accomplished without undue hardship on the
operation of the business.16 These provisions expressly proscribe discriminatory treatment that is
effectuated because of disabling conditions.17 The statute also prohibits disparate impact
discrimination that results – whether intentionally or inadvertently – from facially-neutral
employment criteria that cause the disqualification of disproportionate percentages of disabled
persons, unless the covered entities can demonstrate that the challenged factors are job-related
and consistent with business necessity. 18 When employment tests are used, they must be
administered to disabled individuals in a manner that ensures that the results accurately reflect
the actual capabilities of these persons despite their impairments.19
To protect employment applicants who do not have obvious impairments from possible
disability discrimination, the ADA prohibits pre-employment medical examinations and pre-
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employment inquiries concerning applicant medical conditions.20 Pre-employment medical
examinations may only be undertaken after job offers have been made, all new employees are
subject to such examinations, the medical information obtained is kept confidential in separate
medical files, and the medical information is not used to discriminate against qualified
individuals because of their disabling conditions.21 While general medical questions may not be
asked of job applicants, employers may describe the job-related functions for the positions in
question and ask prospective employees whether they could perform those tasks.22 Once
employees begin to work for covered firms, post-employment medical examinations may not be
required – they may only be conducted on a voluntary basis.23
The three critical inquiries under the applicable employment discrimination provisions
concern: (1) who are “disabled” individuals under the statute; (2) which disabled individuals are
“qualified” for the positions in question; and (3) what “reasonable accommodations” may enable
disabled persons to perform the essential functions of those positions. The ADA contains a threepart definition of “disability:”
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual –
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.24
This definition was taken almost verbatim from the Rehabilitation Act.25 Under the first prong,
individuals with current impairments that substantially limit any major life activity are protected.
The second prong applies to persons who previously suffered from disabling conditions of a
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substantially limiting nature, and have records of such, but who are no longer substantially
limited. The third prong includes individuals who do not have disabling conditions, but are
erroneously thought to have one. They may have impairments that are not substantially limiting,
but employers believe those conditions cause them to be substantially limited. They may
alternatively have no impairments, but employers incorrectly think they have conditions which, if
they had them, would be substantially limiting. If an individual’s situation falls within any prong,
that person is entitled to ADA coverage.26
Although Congress failed to provide definitions of “substantially limits” or “major life
activities,” it suggested that the definitions previously established by agencies empowered to
enforce different provisions of the Rehabilitation Act should be applied to ADA cases.27
Department of Health, Education & Welfare (HEW) regulations promulgated under the
Rehabilitation Act define “physical and mental impairments” to include physiological disorders,
cosmetic disfigurements, and anatomical losses affecting neurological, musculoskeletal, sensory,
respiratory, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine systems and mental retardation, organic brain syndrom, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities.28 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
regulations adopted pursuant to ADA administrative authorization have adopted this HEW
approach.29 Relevant Rehabilitation Act regulations define “major life activities” to include
“functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”30 ADA committee reports expressly endorsed these
administrative interpretations.31
EEOC regulations define the term “substantially limits” to cover individuals who are
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unable to perform a major life activity that average persons in the general population can perform
or who are significantly restricted as to the manner under which they can perform a major life
activity compared to the manner under which average people in the general population can
perform the same major life activity.32 When determining whether disabling conditions are
substantially limiting, EEOC regulations indicate that three factors should be considered: “(i)
[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the
impairment; [and] (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long
term impact of or resulting from the impairment.”33
Under the ADA, a “‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”34 “Reasonable
accommodations” include ready accessibility for disabled persons, job restructuring, part-time or
modified work scheduling, reassignment to vacant positions, acquisition or modification of
equipment, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations.35 The
term “undue hardship” means “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when
considered in light of . . . – (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation . . .; (ii) the overall
financial resources of the facility or facilities involved . . .; the number of persons employed at
such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise . . . upon the
operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size
of the business . . ., with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location
of its facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity . . .”36
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The employment discrimination provisions of the ADA are enforced against private
sector parties through the procedures set forth in Section 706 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.37 Persons who believe they have been discriminated against must file charges with the
EEOC, which tries to conduct investigations and determine whether it appears that violations
have occurred. If EEOC investigators find cause to believe unlawful discrimination has taken
place, the EEOC may decide to sue on behalf of the claimants. In most cases, however,
regardless of whether the EEOC investigators have found cause or no cause to think
discrimination has occurred, the agency issues right-to-sue letters informing the claimants of
their right to file law suits.
III. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF ADA COVERAGE
The most pertinent pre-ADA case decided by the Supreme Court was School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline,38 a case that arose under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,39 which
prohibits federal fund recipients from discriminating against “otherwise qualified” individuals
with disabilities.40 Arline was an elementary school teacher. She had tuberculosis that
occasionally became contagious. After her third contagious incident within two years, the school
district terminated her employment. She brought a Rehabilitation Act suit.
The Arline Court had to initially decide whether a person with a contagious disease
should be considered a “handicapped [now ‘disabled’] individual.” The Court acknowledged two
important factors. First, that contagious conditions that affect fundamental body systems
constitute covered impairments.41 The Court also recognized the validity of the HEW regulation
defining “major life activities,” used in the Rehabilitation Act definition of “handicap,” to
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include “working.”42 “Congress plainly intended the Act to cover persons with a physical or
mental impairment . . . that substantially limited one’s ability to work. ‘[T]he primary goal of the
Act is to increase employment of the handicapped’.”43
Although the Court found Arline to be disabled by her contagious disease, it did not
decide that she was entitled to her former teaching position. It held that she could only prevail if
she could demonstrate that despite her condition she was “qualified” to teach elementary school.
The Court indicated that the lower courts had to make an individualized assessment of the
potential impact of Arline’s contagious disease on others to determine if she was “qualified.”44
Borrowing from an amicus brief filed by the American Medical Association, the Arline Court
articulated the standards to be applied to such inquiries:
[Findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given
the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk
(how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how
long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is
the potential harm to third parties), and (d) the probabilities the
disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of
harm.45
Given the real risk of tuberculin contagion and the severe nature of the potential harm to others
exposed, it was evident that school teachers with such contagious diseases would not be
considered “qualified” under the Rehabilitation Act. Except in unusual situations, no
accommodation could be made for such teachers that would enable them to perform their regular
duties without undue rick of harm to others.
Following the Arline decision, many people erroneously thought that the Supreme Court
had held that persons with contagious tuberculosis could work as school teachers. They failed to
appreciate the fact that contagious people would not be “qualified” to work with others who
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might become infected by their disease. In response to this public outcry, Congress amended the
Rehabilitation Act to explicitly indicate that persons who have “currently contagious” diseases or
infections are not covered by the employment provisions of that enactment.46 This legislative
change was specifically limited to contagious conditions that would pose a serious risk of harm
to others. It did not otherwise alter the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Arline. As a
result, claimants found to have covered disabilities must still prove that, with or without
accommodations, they are “qualified” to perform the positions in question.
The first major Supreme Court decision interpreting the disability provisions of the ADA
did not involve an employment dispute; it concerned an asymptomatic HIV infected individual
who had been denied regular treatment at a dental office.47 The Bragdon Court initially noted that
the ADA’s disability definition was taken almost verbatim from the definition contained in the
Rehabilitation Act, and it recognized that “Congress’ repetition of a well-established term carries
the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing
regulatory interpretations.”48 The Court also noted the ADA provision indicating that ADA
sections are to be interpreted in conformity with regulations issued by Federal agencies under the
Rehabilitation Act.49
The Bragdon Court next reviewed the HEW regulation indicating that covered physical
impairments include those affecting the reproductive system.50 Since the Court found that
“[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself,” it
agreed that reproduction constitutes a “major life activity.”51 It next found that HIV infected
persons are substantially limited in their ability to reproduce due to the threat to their sexual
partners and to children born to HIV infected mothers.52 The claimant thus had a condition that
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substantially limits a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA. Although the Bragdon
case did not involve employment rights, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court
approvingly cited an EEOC regulation indicating that asymptomatic HIV infected people
constitute covered persons.53
The first coverage decisions arising under the employment discrimination provisions of
the ADA were issued in 1999. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.54 Concerned twin sisters who
applied to become global pilots with United. Both suffered from severe myopia which caused
each to have uncorrected visual acuity of 20/200 in one eye and 20/400 in the other. Nonetheless,
with corrective lenses, they both had at least 20/20 vision in both eyes. Although they both met
United’s other global pilot requirements, they were denied consideration for positions by virtue
of a company policy requiring uncorrected visual acuity of at least 20/100. They then brought
claims under the ADA.
The Sutton Court had to initially decide whether mitigating measures, such as corrective
lenses and prescription medication, should be considered when determining whether particular
conditions substantially limit major life activities. It noted that a regulation promulgated by the
EEOC pursuant to its administrative authority to interpret the employment discrimination
provisions of the ADA expressly stated that “[t]he determination of whether an individual is
substantially limited . . . must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.”55 The Court indicated that while
different administrative agencies had been given the authority to issue interpretative regulations
pertaining to their respective sections of the ADA, none was empowered to issue regulations
concerning the generally applicable provisions which contained the statutory definition of
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“disability.”56 The Court thus questioned the propriety of administrative regulations defining
disabling conditions. This was a somewhat surprising observation, because it would preclude
relevant administrative agencies from issuing regulations that could be used to initially determine
whether individuals raising claims under the different parts of the ADA are subject to disability
coverage. Perhaps recognizing this anomaly, the Court decided to evaluate the appropriateness of
the EEOC regulation as if it had been properly promulgated.
The Sutton Court considered the overall framework of the ADA and concluded that the
EEOC regulation constituted an impermissible interpretation of the Act’s scope. Justice
O’Connor, writing for the seven-Justice majority, stated that “it is apparent that if a person is
taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those
measures – both positive and negative – must be taken into account when judging whether that
person is ‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity. . .”57 She emphasized the fact that the
ADA is phrased in the present verb tense, and concluded that “[a] disability exists only where an
impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity, not where it ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or ‘would’ be
substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.”58 Justice O’Connor also noted that
the ADA requires an individualized determination of disability status, and suggested that the
EEOC guideline mandating that disability coverage be evaluated without regard to mitigating
measures runs counter to the need for an individualized assessment.59
The final factor undermining the propriety of the EEOC regulation concerned the
statement in the congressional findings section of the ADA indicating that “some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities.”60 Justice O’Connor reasoned that if
everyone with medical conditions controlled through eyeglasses, prostheses, and medications
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were considered disabled, far more than 43,000,000 people would be included; over 160,000,000
persons would be covered.61 She thus found that the EEOC regulation did not constitute a
permissible interpretation of the ADA’s disability definition.
Dissenting Justices Stevens and Breyer disagreed with this portion of the majority
decision. They cited comments in the House and Senate reports indicating that disability
determinations should be made without consideration of mitigating measures.62 Since they
thought that the EEOC regulation reflected this legislative intent, they argued that it should have
been sustained.
Although the Sutton majority rejected the claimants’ assertion that they were entitled to
protection under the first prong of the statutory definition of disability, due to their normal visual
acuity in the corrected state, it still had to determine whether they were protected under the third
prong as persons who were “regarded as” disabled by United. There was no doubt that they had
been rejected for global pilot positions because of their uncorrected visual capabilities. Did this
mean that United regarded them as “disabled”? Justice O’Connor held no, by restricting the
scope of the third prong:
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within
[the “regarded as”] definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly
believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity
mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities.63
The Court thus had to determine whether United believed that the claimants’ correctable myopia
substantially limited them with respect to a major life activity.
The Sutton majority acknowledged that the applicable EEOC regulation states that
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working constitutes a major life activity. 64 The Court questioned whether working should really
be considered a major life activity, pointing out that even the EEOC regulation treats working as
a “residual life activity” that should be “considered, as a last resort, only ‘[i]f an individual is not
substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity.’”65 The Court wholly ignored
the fact that it had previously recognized in the Arline case that working was a “major life
activity” under the Rehabilitation Act.66 Nonetheless, the Court assumed that working constituted
a major life activity for purposes of resolving the Sutton case.
The EEOC regulation only considers impairments to be substantially limiting with respect
to the ability of persons to work when their conditions significantly restrict their capacity “to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single,
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”67
Justice O’Connor indicated that while Congress had acknowledged that the potential negative
impact of societal myths regarding the actual capabilities of persons with mental or physical
impairments could be as handicapping as real disabilities, it did not intend to preclude employers
from establishing valid employment standards that might adversely affect some people with
medical conditions – so long as these criteria do not substantially limit their opportunities to
work.68 United’s visual acuity standard clearly disadvantaged the Sutton claimants, but it did not
disqualify them from a class or range of jobs. It merely prevented them from becoming global
pilots. They retained the capacity to function as regional pilots, courier service pilots, or pilot
trainers. They were thus not regarded as being substantially limited in their ability to work.69
Murphy v. United Parcel Service70 concerned a truck mechanic with high blood pressure.
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His work with United Parcel Service required him to drive commercial vehicles which meant that
he had to obtain a Department of Transportation (DOT) health certificate. Although his
hypertension was mitigated by prescription medication, his blood pressure remained sufficiently
elevated to prevent him from obtaining DOT certification. As a result, he was terminated by
United Parcel Service. He claimed that this action contravened the ADA.
The same seven-Justice majority that decided the Sutton case rejected Murphy’s claim.
Justice O’Connor reiterated the fact that an impairment would only constitute an actual disability
if, in the mitigated state, it substantially limited a major life activity. 71 Since the blood pressure
medication taken by Murphy ameliorated the negative impact of his hypertension, he was not
substantially limited due to that condition. The Court next had to decide whether United Parcel
Service regarded Murphy as disabled with respect to his ability to work by terminating him
because of his failure to obtain DOT health certification. The Court reaffirmed the Sutton view
that persons are only “regarded as” disabled with respect to their ability to work when they are
considered unable to perform a class or range of jobs, but not when employers merely believe
that they are precluded from performing particular jobs.72 The majority Justices noted that while
Murphy could not work as a mechanic for a firm requiring DOT health certification, he could
work in various other mechanic positions that did not involve the driving of vehicles covered by
DOT regulations. As a result, he was only considered by United Parcel Service to be unqualified
for a particular job and not a broad range of mechanic jobs, rendering him unprotected under the
ADA.73
On the same day the Supreme Court issued its Sutton and Murphy decisions, it announced
its opinion in Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.74 Kirkingburg was a truck driver who suffered
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from amblyopia, an uncorrectable eye condition that left him with 20/200 vision in one eye
effectively leaving him with monocular vision.75 Despite this condition, Kirkingburg had learned
to compensate for his monocularity and was less affected than other people suffering from
amblyopia. Albertson’s hired Kirkingburg as a truck driver, a position that required a DOT
fitness certification mandating a minimum corrected visual acuity of at least 20/40 in each eye..
He was examined by a physician who erroneously certified him. Kirkingburg injured himself at
work and took some time off. When he returned to work, another eye examination discovered
that he actually failed to satisfy the minimal DOT vision requirement. DOT told him he would
have to obtain a waiver, under a test program being conducted by DOT to determine if it should
modify its long-standing visual acuity standards, if he wished to continue to drive. He applied for
a DOT waiver, but was terminated by Albertson’s, while his waiver petition was pending,
because of the fact he failed to meet the usual DOT visual standard. Even though he was
thereafter granted a DOT waiver, Albertson’s refused to reemploy him. He filed suit under the
ADA.
The District Court granted Albertson’s motion for summary judgement, because it found
that Kirkingburg was not qualified to be a truck driver due to his visual impairment. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that Kirkingburg’s monocularity constituted
a disability due to its impact on his ability to see. The Ninth Circuit failed to consider
Kirkingburg’s own measures taken to mitigate the impact of his amblyopia.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach, holding that even
an individual’s personal mitigation efforts must be considered when determining whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity. “We see no principled basis for
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distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices,
and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body’s own systems.”76 While the
Court recognized that monocularity may be substantially limiting for some people, it might not
be for others who have learned to cope with it. Disability status should not be based on group
generalizations, but must be decided on a case-by-case basis considering the particular
circumstances affecting the claimant.77 While “people with monocular vision ‘ordinarily’ will
meet the Act’s definition of disability, . . . [w]e simply hold that the Act requires monocular
individuals, like others claiming the Act’s protection, to prove a disability by offering evidence
that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth perception
and visual field, is substantial.”78
The Albertson’s Court went on to consider whether Kirkingburg was “qualified” within
the meaning of the ADA. It noted that covered entities may impose minimal standards for
positions that adversely affect disabled applicants, so long as those criteria are “job-related and
consistent with business necessity, and . . . performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation . . .”79 The ADA specifically recognizes that employers may impose limitations
designed to ensure that “an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals in the workplace.”80 Even though the Ninth Circuit had indicated that the DOT
waiver program precluded Albertson’s from claiming that Kirkingburg was unable to perform his
driving job safely, the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. 81 It noted that the waiver program
was experimental and concluded that Albertson’s had the right to rely on the long-standing DOT
visual acuity standards that Kirkingburg could not satisfy.82
The most recent Supreme Court decision pertaining to the ADA definition of disability
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was issued last June. Toyota Motor v. Williams83 concerned a production line worker who
developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendinitis that significantly reduced her
range of motion and weight lifting capabilities.84 She was ultimately transferred from her engine
fabricating assembly line position to a quality control team. Her team was initially responsible for
only paint inspections, and Williams was able to perform these tasks satisfactorily for a couple of
years. Toyota finally decided that quality control teams had to perform other inspection tasks that
required workers to apply a light oil to the hood, fender, doors, rear quarter panel, and trunk of
passing cars.85 These wiping duties compelled Williams to hold her hands and arms at shoulder
height for several hours at a time, and she began to experience pain in her neck and shoulders.
She asked to be reassigned to the visual paint inspection tasks which she previously performed,
but Toyota refused. She began to miss work and was eventually terminated. She filed a claim
under the ADA alleging that her impairments substantially limited her ability to perform manual
tasks.
The District Court rejected Williams’ ADA claim, finding that she had failed to
demonstrate that she was substantially limited with respect to the major life activities of
performing manual tasks or working. 86 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that
Williams was substantially limited with regard to the performance of manual tasks associated
with her work. A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s approach.
The Supreme Court initially noted that Congress intended the term “disability” under the
ADA to be interpreted in accordance with the regulatory interpretations that had been established
under the Rehabilitation Act.87 Nonetheless, “[m]erely having an impairment does not make one
disabled for purposes of the ADA. Claimants also need to demonstrate that the impairment limits
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a major life activity.”88 The HEW regulations listed various “major life activities,” including the
performance of manual tasks.89 Although the HEW regulations do not define the term
“substantially limits,” EEOC regulations do provide guidance in this area.
[S]ubstantially limited” means “[u]nable to perform a major life
activity that the
average person in the general population can
perform”; or “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner,
or duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the . . . manner . . . under which
the average person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity.90
When evaluating substantially limiting claims, “the following factors should be considered:
‘[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and [t]he permanent or long-term impact or the expected permanent or long-term
impact of or resulting from the impairment.’”91
The Court first evaluated Williams’ claim that she was substantially limited in her ability
to work. Although the Court again refused to hold that work was a major life activity, it assumed
that is was for analytical purposes.92 It reiterated the view that persons are only substantially
limited with respect to work when they can demonstrate the inability to perform a class of jobs or
a broad range of jobs, and the Court intimated, without deciding, that Williams’ condition was
not so expansively limiting. 93 It then held that the Sixth Circuit had erred when it evaluated
Williams’ ability to perform manual tasks associated with her work. The Court indicated that the
lower court should have instead assessed her capacity to perform “the variety of tasks central to
most people’s daily lives, not . . . [those] associated with her specific job.”94 Since Williams was
still able to brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do
laundry, and pick up around the house, the Court found that her impairment did not substantially
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limit her ability to perform the manual tasks associated with everyday life.95
Two other 2002 Supreme Court decisions also concerned the scope of employment
discrimination protection available under the ADA. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal96 involved
an oil refinery worker with Hepatitis C which affected his liver. He was employed by
independent contractors to work at an oil refinery owned by Chevron U.S.A., and he twice sought
employment directly with Chevron U.S.A. at that facility. Chevron U.S.A. rejected his
applications because of his Hepatitis C, and it finally asked the independent contractor for which
he was then working not to assign him to jobs that exposed him to toxins that might exacerbate
his liver condition.97 After the contractor laid Echazabal off, he filed a claim against Chevron
U.S.A. under the ADA. Chevron U.S.A. defended under an EEOC regulation permitting
employers to deny people positions that would pose a “direct threat” to their own health.98 The
District Court accepted this Chevron U.S.A. defense, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. It held that the statutory exception contained in the ADA was limited to situations in
which impaired individuals would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the
workplace.99 Since Echazabal’s condition merely posed a threat to his own health, his situation
did not fall within this provision.
A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach. It acknowledged that
the statutory exception was limited to circumstances in which an impaired person posed a direct
threat to others, but found that the EEOC regulation extending the exclusion to persons posing a
direct threat to themselves constituted an acceptable interpretation of the statute’s general
qualification standards.100 To prevent unreasonably paternalistic attitudes to limit the
employment opportunities of disabled individuals, the Court indicated that “[t]he direct threat
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defense must be ‘based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge and/or the best available objective evidence,’ and upon an expressly ‘individualized
assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the
job.’”101 The case was remanded to the lower courts to allow them to determine the seriousness
of any risk the oil refinery work would pose to Echazabal’s liver condition.
In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,102 the Supreme Court had to determine the impact of
employer-established seniority rules on the statutory duty of covered firms to offer disabled
individuals reasonable accommodations that could be provided without undue hardship. Barnett
was a cargo handler who injured his back.103 He was transferred to a less physically demanding
mailroom position that he was able to perform. The mailroom position was subject to periodic
bidding under the US Airways seniority system. When the position became open for bidding two
years after Barnett first occupied it, he learned that two workers with greater seniority were
seeking it. He asked US Airways to make an exception for him due to his back injury, but US
Airways refused to do so. Barnett claimed that US Airways thus violated its duty to offer him a
reasonable accommodation for his back condition.
The District Court rejected Barnett’s ADA claim, holding that the need for US Airways to
modify its established seniority system would have created an “undue hardship.”104 The Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the existence of a seniority system was simply a factor to be
considered in the undue hardship analysis. The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
approach.
The Court initially noted that the ADA requires employers to offer reasonable
accommodations to individuals with disabilities, including reassignment to vacant positions,
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where such accommodations can be accomplished without undue hardship.105 US Airways cited
its seniority system and argued that any accommodation that would conflict with established
seniority expectations would be “unreasonable.” Even though the US Airways seniority system
was unilaterally established, and did not result from a collective bargaining relationship, and US
Airways “reserve[d] the right to change any and all” aspects of the system at will, the Court
decided to treat all established seniority systems similarly.106 While a modification of seniority
expectations may not adversely affect employer interests, it would have a significant impact on
worker expectations.107 As a result, while proposed accommodations that would conflict with
established seniority policies would not constitute undue hardships to the affected employers,
they would usually be “unreasonable” because of the adverse effects on the expectations of more
senior employees.108
The Court thus established a presumption that proposed accommodations that would alter
worker expectations under established seniority systems would be “unreasonable.” To overcome
this presumption, claimants would have to demonstrate either that the employer so frequently
makes changes in the system that employee expectations are minimal or that the system contains
so many exceptions that one more exception will not unduly affect worker interests.109 Under
such circumstances, a proposed exception to seniority rights may be found to constitute a
“reasonable” accommodation. The case was remanded to the lower courts to allow Barnett to
present any evidence that might overcome the presumption that his proposed accommodation
was unreasonable because of its conflict with the established seniority system,

IV. EVALUATION OF SUPREME COURT APPROACH
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The Supreme Court appears to be concerned about two aspects of the employment
discrimination protections contained in the ADA. First, the Court seems to think that Congress
went too far in extending such expansive protection to millions of individuals with physical and
mental impairments. Second, the Court apparently fears that if claimants are found disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, they will obtain or retain positions they are not fully capable of
performing. The short response to the Court’s first concern is that it is none of the Court’s
business. If Justices are not satisfied with particular legislation, they should run for Congress and
try to amend the statute they find offensive. As members of the judiciary, they should feel
obliged to interpret and apply the statutory provisions as they think Congress intended them to be
applied – even if they do not like the results.
The Court’s second concern fails to appreciate the entire scope of the ADA. The statute is
not as expansive as the Justices may fear. Its protections are limited to persons with conditions
that substantially limit one or more major life activities. People who are only moderately affected
are not covered, unless they are discriminated against because of records of prior impairments or
because they are regarded as having substantially limiting impairments they do not actually have.
Furthermore, even if individuals are substantially limited, the ADA does not guarantee them
employment. They must be able to demonstrate that they are “qualified” employment candidates.
The Supreme Court thus ignores the true paradox associated with the employment discrimination
provisions of the ADA. You have to be so significantly limited by your condition to be protected
that you are often unable, with or without an accommodation, to perform the essential functions
of the job.110 In addition, if proposed accommodations are found to be “unreasonable” or to
constitute “undue hardships,” the claimants will be denied protection. As a direct result of the
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Supreme Court’s judicial narrowing of ADA coverage, Disability Act plaintiffs win less often
than plaintiffs seeking redress under other Federal anti-discrimination statutes.111
A third factor may also underlie the Supreme Court’s parsimonious approach to ADA
cases – the expanding civil rights docket of federal district courts. The number of employment
discrimination complaints filed in district courts almost tripled over the past decade from 8413 in
1990 to 22,412 in 1999.112 These claims accounted for 8.6 percent of civil actions filed in district
courts in 1999.113 Plaintiffs prevailed in fewer than one-third of the cases culminating in verdicts,
generating median awards of $137,000 in 1998.114 Part of the increased civil rights caseload is
attributable to the enactment of the ADA in 1990. Judges frequently complain privately about the
high volume of employment discrimination claims that produce relatively modest awards for
prevailing plaintiffs. They hate to spend substantial judicial time on such cases.
If the Supreme Court establishes narrow coverage standards for ADA plaintiffs, it can
increase the number of employment discrimination cases that can be disposed of though
defendant summary judgment motions. The most effective way to accomplish this objective is to
define “disability” narrowly, as the Court has done. If lower courts are required to determine
whether disabled persons are qualified to perform essential job functions, with or without
reasonable accommodations, these fact-specific inquiries would make it difficult for trial courts
to dispose of these cases through summary judgment motions. Additional proceedings would be
required that would often culminate in bench or jury trials.
In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,115 the Supreme Court could have
further reduced the need for trials in ADA cases involving plaintiffs who had previously sought
Social Security disability benefits claiming to be totally unable to work. The lower courts had
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held that people who file ADA law suits after they had applied for Social Security disability
benefits should generally have their ADA claims dismissed, because their ADA assertions of
discrimination against qualified disabled individuals were contradicted by their prior Social
Security disability claims.116 Although the Supreme Court could have accepted this approach to
defeat most ADA discrimination claims filed by people who had previously asserted totally
disabling conditions for Social Security purposes, it chose not to do so. The Cleveland Court
acknowledged the fact that Social Security administrators determine how disabled applicants are
without regard to whether they could perform essential job functions with the aid of
accommodations, while the ADA expressly obliges covered entities to offer disabled job
candidates reasonable accommodations whenever they are available.117 Thus claimants could be
totally disabled for Social Security purposes, yet remain employable for ADA purposes. The
Court went on to suggest, however, that ADA plaintiffs who had previously filed disability
claims with the Social Security Administration would have to provide courts with explanations
that would be “sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s concluding that, assuming the truth of,
or the plaintiff’s good-faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless
‘perform the essential functions’ of [the] job, with or without reasonable accommodation.’”118
The Cleveland Court has thus made it fairly easy for district courts to grant defendant summary
judgment motions in these cases, except when plaintiffs can convince trial judges that their prior
Social Security disability assertions are not entirely inconsistent with their current ADA
employment discrimination allegations.
A. DEFINITION OF ‘DISABILITY”

25
The ADA defines “disability” to include: (1) individuals with impairments that
substantially limit one or more major life activities; (2) persons with a record of such
impairment; and (3) people who are “regarded as” being so impaired.119 Under the actually
disabled prong, claimants must establish three critical factors: (1) they have physical or mental
impairments (2) that are substantially limiting (3) with respect to some major life activity. The
first part of this proof construct is generally straight forward. Physical and mental impairments
include medical conditions that are recognized by physicians as psysiological or psychological
disorders. ADA claimants generally present expert medical testimony to establish this
prerequisite to coverage.
The second factor requires proof that the demonstrated impairments are substantially
limiting with regard to some major life activity. EEOC regulations have borrowed from HEW
regulations under the Rehabilitation Act to list as “major life activities” “caring for one’s self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.”120 Although the first eight are relatively uncontroversial, the Court has had a more
difficult time with the ninth: “working.” In cases like Sutton, the Court initially questioned
whether the EEOC had the regulatory authority under the ADA to promulgate regulations
defining the term “disability,” because the EEOC’s authority extends to the employment
discrimination provisions of that statute and the definitions are set forth in the preliminary
sections of the Act.121 Since the employment discrimination section only covers individuals with
“disabilities,” it would be incongruous to deny the EEOC the power to adopt regulations
indicating which medical conditions fall within the statute’s general coverage. So long as the
EEOC regulations defining “disability” are consistent with the statutory language the agency is
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explaining, the EEOC interpretations should be accorded judicial deference since promulgated by
the expert agency given the authority to interpret the relevant sections of the act.122
The EEOC’s inclusion of “working” as a “major life activity” should similarly be
considered uncontroversial.123 For members of the active labor force, their employment is critical
to their economic and emotional well-being. People’s identities are directly affected by their
work. So are their financial circumstances. If this factor were not alone sufficient to convince the
Court to accept working as a major life activity, the fact that Congress expressly proscribed
discrimination against qualified disabled individuals under the Title I of the ADA should
emphasize the critical nature of employment in that statutory scheme. If working is not
considered a major life activity, this would seriously undermine the entire employment
discrimination portion of the ADA. There are individuals whose impairments do not substantially
limit them with respect to other major life activities, but do substantially limit them with regard
to their ability to work.124 Congress clearly intended to protect such people.
The most significant part of the Sutton decision concerns the impact of mitigating
measures on the substantially limiting portion of the disability definition. Although EEOC and
Department of Justice regulations indicated that the disability question should be answered
without regard to mitigating factors,125 I find myself in agreement with the Sutton majority – but
not for the identical reasons. They were concerned that if disability determinations were to be
made considering the unmitigated status of claimants, courts would be forced to deal with purely
hypothetical circumstances. They would have to speculate about how limited the individuals
would be if their impairments were not ameliorated through medication, eye glasses, hearing
aids, or prostheses. Such an approach would not be that speculative. Expert witnesses would be
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asked to evaluate claimants in their unmitigated state and testify how those particular persons
would be limited with respect to major life activities. How well would a visually impaired person
function without corrective lenses? How mobile would a person be without a prosthesis or a
wheelchair? How would a diabetic or person with a bi-polar condition function without
prescription medication? It would not be that difficult for judges or juries to determine the degree
to which impaired claimants would be affected in their unmitigated state.
Why then do I agree with the Sutton Court’s decision to make disability determinations
considering claimants in their mitigated state? The first prong of the ADA’s disability definition
only protects persons with conditions that are substantially limiting. If the adverse effects of
medical impairments can be significantly diminished through appliances or medications, the
persons with those conditions would not be truly limited.126 It is thus apparent that the
administrative regulations requiring courts to decide whether medical conditions are substantially
limiting without regard to ameliorative measures are inconsistent with the express language of
the ADA. If mitigating measures enable otherwise impaired people to function relatively
normally, they can hardly be considered disabled under the first prong of the statutory definition.
Support for this interpretation is provided by Professor Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., a disability rights
advocate who drafted the original ADA bill introduced in Congress. In an extensive article
published the year after the ADA was enacted, he indicated that conditions controlled through
mitigating measures would not be considered covered.127
Even with some “traditional” disabilities, it may not be easy to
show that a condition significantly limits a major life activity.
Conditions such as epilepsy, controlled by medication; diabetes, in
which insulin treatment is progressing routinely; cancer, multiple
sclerosis and other conditions during periods of remission;
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cosmetic disfigurements such as facial scars or deformities; lowerleg amputations where the individual has a properly fitted prosthesis; and many other conditions
traditionally considered to be “disabilities” may not have a substantial impact on performance of
major life activities.128
Erica Worth Harris has similarly acknowledged that persons with mitigated conditions
should not be accorded ADA coverage under the first prong:
Individuals with controlled impairments do not suffer from a
fundamental difference in living historically and have not been
subjected to discrimination. No social stigmas attach to controlled
impairments precisely because they are controlled. No stereotypes
or misperceptions attach to controlled impairments because they
have no obvious effect on the daily activities on the individuals.129
Ms. Harris has also noted that even if impaired individuals were evaluated in their
unmitigated states to determine initial statutory coverage, firms would be under a statutory duty
to provide them with reasonable accommodations for their conditions.130 The most obvious
accommodations for such persons would be to provide them with the mitigation measures that
would, under the Sutton approach, render them non-disabled. While this is correct, this approach
differs in one critical aspect from the Sutton Court’s approach. Under Sutton, people whose
impairments can be controlled through mitigating measures are not “disabled.” Under the
rejected EEOC approach, however, such persons would be found disabled if their unmitigated
conditions were substantially limiting, necessitating reasonable accommodations for their
impairments. As a result, employers that discriminated against them because of their unmitigated
states would be in violation of the ADA. Nonetheless, because of the fact the ADA definition
requires proof of actual limitations, I find the Sutton Court’s pronouncement with respect to the
impact of mitigating measures to be defensible.
Where impairments actually do diminish the capacity of people to perform various job
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tasks, when should these persons be considered disabled for ADA purposes? As the Sutton Court
recognized, the applicable EEOC regulation requires proof that the adversely affected people are
“significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes . . .”131 For some purposes, the first part of this regulatory definition should be
controlling, while for others the second part should be pertinent.
For individuals with general employment skills, they should only be considered
substantially limited with respect to their ability to work where they are unable to perform “a
broad range of jobs.” If their skills and background render them qualified to perform different
jobs despite their inability to perform some jobs, they should not be treated as disabled. On the
other hand, individuals with highly specialized training relevant to a particular “class of jobs”
should be entitled to statutory protection when impairments substantially limit their capacity to
work in that class of jobs.
The Sutton sisters had extremely focused training; they were jet pilots. They hoped to
obtain high-paying global pilot positions with a major air line. In the civilian setting, these skills
were primarily for commercial flying positions. While their vision was normal when they wore
glasses, their uncorrected visual acuity failed to meet usual air line standards. This caused them
to be disqualified from an entire class of jobs – that of global pilot. If their myopia rendered them
ineligible for global pilot positions with commercial air lines, they should have been considered
“substantially limited” with regard to this “class of jobs.” As such, the Sutton Court should have
found them subject to ADA coverage. Even though they could have worked as regional pilots or
as pilot trainers, they had not obtained their extensive training merely to qualify them for such
lower-paying occupations.
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If the Sutton sisters had been found disabled, would they ipso facto have been entitled to
pilot positions with United? Not necessarily. They would still have had to demonstrate that, with
or without a reasonable accommodation, they could have performed the essential functions of the
job safely and efficiently. As we shall explore in the next section, it is not clear whether they
could have carried this burden.
The Murphy case provides a perfect example of a claimant whose situation had to be
evaluated with respect to his ability to perform “a broad range of jobs.” Murphy was a truck
mechanic. Because of high blood pressure, Murphy could not obtain the commercial license he
needed to work on trucks for United Parcel Service. Despite Murphy’s hypertension, he was able
to work as a mechanic for various firms that did not require him to have a commercial license.
Given his training and experience, he was thus not substantially limited with respect to “a broad
range of jobs.”
The Kirkingburg case raised more complex issues. Although the Supreme Court was
correct in considering mitigation measures undertaken through the claimant’s own body system,
it failed to fully appreciate the impact of monocular vision on a person’s ability to see.
Kirkingburg’s self-correction efforts may have minimized the impact of his amblyopia on his
ability to see things at a distance, those efforts would have been of minimal help with respect to
depth perception at short distances.132 This fact should have induced the Court to acknowledge
that he was still substantially limited with respect to his ability to see compared to people without
such an impairment. The Court implicitly conceded this point, since it went on to determine
whether Kirkingburg was “qualified” for truck driving positions with Albertson’s.
Should Kirkingburg have been found disabled because of the impact of his amblyopia on
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his ability to work? He was a truck driver with general employment skills. Although he could not
drive for Albertson’s because of his inability to satisfy minimal DOT vision standards, his
distance vision was not severely affected. There is thus every reason to believe that he could have
obtained other driving positions that did not require DOT certification. In addition, he may have
been qualified to perform various non-driving jobs that would not have required short-distance
depth perception. Unless he could have demonstrated the inability to perform “a broad range of
jobs” for someone with his education, training, and experience, he should not have been
considered disabled with respect to the impact of his amblyopia on his capacity to work.
The Williams case provides another example of someone who should have to demonstrate
that she was unable to perform “a broad range of jobs” before she would be entitled to ADA
coverage. Williams had a general education and was trained to perform production line work.
With this background, she could presumably have worked for various manufacturing firms, or
could have used her general skills in the service sector. As a result, it would not have been
sufficient for her to show that she could no longer work for Toyota. She would have had to prove
the inability to work in “a broad range of” manufacturing and/or service jobs.
In the actual case, Williams did not try to establish Disability Act protection using the
major life activity of working. She instead relied upon her inability to perform manual tasks. Had
she tried to fit her situation within the working life activity, she should have been considered
covered. With rather severe bilateral carpel tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendinitis, she could
hardly use her hands and arms, and found it painful to lift her arms above her shoulders.133 These
limitations rendered her incapable of performing most production jobs, most office or clerical
jobs, and most retail or service jobs. As such, she was substantially limited with regard to her
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ability to work in “a broad range of jobs” commensurate with her training and experience.
The Supreme Court also erred when it found that Williams had not established that she
was substantially limited with respect to her ability to perform manual tasks. Even though she
could brush her teeth, comb her hair, clean, cook, and wash with some difficulty, she was
severely restricted regarding her ability to perform these basic tasks compared to members of the
general population. Short of a total loss of the use of both hands and arms, it would be difficult to
imagine a more severely impaired person. It was thus incongruous for the Court to find her not
disabled. Had it done so, however, she would still have had a difficult time proving that she was
“qualified” to work for Toyota.
As the “Supreme Legislature” judicially narrowed the ADA definition of “disability,” it
repeatedly cited the first section of the ADA estimating the number of disabled persons in the
U.S. to be 43,000,000.134 While they reworked the operative ADA language, the Justices ignored
both this legislative finding and the expansive congressional purpose underlying the ADA. Given
the Court’s parsimonious interpretive decisions, it is likely that far fewer than 43,000,000
Americans are now covered under the first prong of that Act’s disability definition. Although the
Court found it appropriate to cite that figure when it worked to limit coverage, it wholly ignored
it when the congressional finding no longer supported its statutory construction.
Even when claimants are not actually limited because of the availability of mitigating
measures, they may be “regarded as” disabled under the third prong of the statutory definition. In
Sutton, the Court suggested two situations in which persons may be “regarded as” disabled: “(1)
a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical [or mental] impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes
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that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.”135
One could logically argue that employers that refuse to employ impaired people (or
persons they think are impaired) because of their medical conditions (or perceived medical
conditions) “regard” such persons as being “disabled.” When Congress enacted the ADA with
its three-prong definition of “disability,” it was as concerned with persons who were considered
by covered entities to be disabled as with individuals who are actually disabled. This was based
upon the reasonable belief that common prejudices, misperceptions, and ignorant stereotypes,
about people with non-disabling physical and mental impairments could be as devastating as
actually disabling conditions.136 This concern induced Congress to include the third prong in the
definition of “disability,” to protect non-disabled people who are “regarded as” disabled by
unthinking or wrong-thinking parties.137
If every impairment or perceived impairment relied upon by covered entities to deny
people employment were considered covered under the “regarded as” prong, the vast majority of
individuals denied employment opportunities could file ADA claims. They could assert that their
wearing of glasses, slight birth marks, minimal limps, or minor depression caused them to be
denied these opportunities because they were “regarded as” disabled. Such an approach would
create an intolerable burden for both the EEOC and the courts. It would also go beyond anything
that Congress could have imagined. As a result, the Sutton Court was probably correct in limiting
the scope of the third prong to situations in which employers believe non-disabling conditions are
substantially limiting or they mistakenly think that individuals have impairments that would be
substantially limiting if they actually had them.
Although I agree with the general standards enunciated by the Sutton Court to delineate
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the scope of the “regarded as” prong of the disability definition, I think the Court has applied its
standards in an overly narrow manner. In Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg, the Court recognized
that particular employers may have refused to employ the claimants because of perceived
disabilities. Since the Court assumed, however, that positions with other firms not so predisposed
could be obtained, the Court found that the negative presumptions of the defendant-employers
did not substantially limit the ability of the claimants to obtain employment in “a wide range of
jobs.”
The Court should have acknowledged the likelihood that other covered firms may have
shared the same stereotypical beliefs as did United Air Lines, Albertson’s, and United Parcel
Service. The Court should thus have asked whether such widely-held stereotypical beliefs
concerning persons with the conditions affecting the claimants would have substantially limited
their chances of obtaining employment in a class or range of jobs.138 If so, the Court should have
found that these individuals were “regarded as” disabled with respect to their ability to work.139
As noted earlier, the inquiry with respect to the Sutton sisters should have been limited to their
ability to gain employment as global pilots, since that was the real class of jobs for which they
had been trained. For Murphy and Kirkingburg, the inquiry should have been more expansive
due to their more generalized backgrounds as a mechanic and a truck driver.
Had the Supreme Court approached the Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg cases more
appropriately, the Justices would have found the claimants to be actually disabled under the first
prong or “regarded as” disabled under the third prong. I should parenthetically note that while the
Court should clearly have found Williams disabled under the first prong because of the
substantially limiting impact of her impairments on her ability to perform manual tasks and to
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work in most jobs for which she was qualified, she could also have established statutory
coverage under the “regarded as” prong due to the fact Toyota thought she could no longer
perform basic manual tasks and essential job functions. Nonetheless, the Court’s apparent
underlying fear that such findings would have enabled these individuals to obtain or retain the
positions in question was erroneous. These claimants would still have been required to
demonstrate that they were qualified, with or without reasonable accommodations, to perform the
essential functions of the positions they sought.
B. QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL JOB FUNCTIONS
When ADA claimants establish that they are actually disabled, they gain general
Disability Act coverage. Nonetheless, they are a long way from prevailing on their employment
discrimination claims. It is not unlawful to discriminate against disabled persons – only to
discriminate against qualified disabled people.140 A “qualified individual with a disability” is
defined narrowly to include only those persons with disabilities “who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position[s]” they hold or
desire.141
If individual disabilities pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others or to
themselves, are they “qualified” under the ADA? For example, disabled persons may wish to
operate equipment that could injure other people if they had seizures or fainting spells. Air line
pilots or vehicle drivers with vision problems that cannot be fully corrected through glasses or
surgery may pose a greater risk to members of the diving public than unimpaired drivers. People
with serious contagious diseases may threaten to infect coworkers or customers. Section
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12113(b)142 explicitly states that “qualification standards” may include a requirement that
disabled persons “not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace.” Whenever such threats to others can be established, the adversely affected disabled
people will be found unqualified – unless reasonable accommodations could be adopted without
undue hardship that would eliminate the risk to others.
Suppose the risk is only to the disabled individuals themselves? Exposure to certain
substances may exacerbate existing conditions. Persons subject to seizures could be seriously
injured if they had an attack while working on elevated platforms or scaffolding. Individuals with
liver or kidney problems may have their conditions adversely affected by exposure to toxic
substances. Should “paternalistic” employers be able to reject such people to protect them from
their own impairments, or should they be allowed to assume the risks generated by their own
conditions? In United Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,143 the Supreme Court
rejected an employer’s effort to restrict the employment of fertile female employees in areas that
would expose them to elevated lead levels, because such exposure might cause birth defects in
their offspring. The Court held that under the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title
VII,144 firms could only establish employment requirements that affected the ability of employees
to perform their job tasks. They could not impose standards designed to protect children who
may be born to employees.
Congress indicated that the employer may take into account only
the woman’s ability to get her job done. . . . [T]he decision to
become pregnant or to work while being either pregnant or capable
of becoming pregnant was reserved for each individual woman to
make for herself. . . . [Title VII] prohibit[s] an employer from
discriminating against a woman because of her capacity to become
pregnant, unless her reproductive potential prevents her from
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performing the duties of her job.145
Should the Johnson Control’s reasoning apply to individuals whose disabilities pose a
direct threat to their own health or safety? In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal,146 the Supreme
Court acknowledged the fact that the ADA exception in Section 12113(b) is limited to direct
threats to others, but concluded that the EEOC regulation extending a statutory exclusion
exclusion to persons posing direct threats to themselves was a reasonable interpretation of the
ADA’s general qualification standards.147 To avail themselves of this exception without unduly
restricting the employment rights of disabled persons, employers would have to make “an
individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential
functions of the job.”148
Echazabal can be easily distinguished from Johnson Controls. Echazabal involved an
impairment that posed a direct threat to the disabled worker himself, while Johnson Controls
concerned only the potential children of present workers. Echazabal could not perform his
regular job functions without risking harm to himself. The Court thus decided that this direct risk
to the employee himself affected his qualification for the job. Johnson Controls, on the other
hand, did not pertain to any situation that might harm the employee herself – merely the
possibility of harm to her future offspring. The Johnson Controls’ Court thus held that the
claimant’s employer had no right to limit her employment based on the potential risk to her nonemployee children.
The ADA does not expressly define the term “essential functions of the job.” It does
indicate, however, that “consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what
functions of a job are essential.”149 This provision further states that “if an employer has prepared
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a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.”150 Congress has thus provided
employers with substantial latitude with respect to the determination of essential job functions.
When firms create job descriptions, they must decide which duties are basic to the positions in
question. What functions should candidates be able to perform or learn to perform if they are to
occupy these positions? So long as employers define these functions reasonably, their
descriptions are entitled to judicial deference. Only where claimants can demonstrate that defined
job duties are of a wholly tangential or secondary nature should courts find them non-essential.
Many disabled job candidates have some difficulty performing essential job functions
without modifications to the positions they seek. As a result, the ADA makes it unlawful for
covered firms to fail to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . ., unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business . . .”151 “Reasonable accommodations” may include making facilities accessible, job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to vacant positions,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, the provision of qualified readers, and
similar arrangements.152
Most accommodations are neither extensive nor expensive.153 The height of the work
station may be raised or lowered, or a higher or lower chair may be provided A doorway may be
widened to allow access to people with mobility difficulties. Ancillary job tasks may be
reassigned to other persons, or disabled employees may be placed in vacant positions they can
perform.
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Once employers know that applicants or current workers have disabling conditions that
limit their ability to perform certain job tasks, they must consider possible accommodations. The
ADA does not require employers to adopt the best accommodations, the ones that would have the
least impact on disabled individuals, or the ones preferred by those persons.154 It merely requires
covered firms to provide “a reasonable accommodation” that will enable disabled people to
perform the essential functions of the jobs in question.155 If employers fail to offer any
accommodations, it is incumbent upon disabled claimants to demonstrate that some
accommodation could have been provided.156 At that point, defendant-employers have three
options: (1) they may accept the candidate-proposed accommodation; (2) they may offer that
person an alternative accommodation; or (3) they may demonstrate that the suggested
accommodation would involve an “undue hardship.”157
When current employees develop disabling conditions that make it impossible for them to
continue in their existing jobs, they may request transfers to other positions they think they can
perform. It is clear under the ADA that their employers need not displace other workers to
accommodate their transfer desires. Section 12111(9)(B) expressly limits reassignment
accommodations to “vacant” positions.158
What should employers do when disabled employees request transfers to vacant positions
that are being sought by other more senior coworkers who claim to have a right to the positions
in question? Such seniority rights may be defined in bargaining agreements negotiated with
representative labor organizations, or they may be set forth in plans unilaterally adopted by firms
without labor unions. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,159 the Supreme Court held that
the obligation to accommodate the religious beliefs of employees imposed by Section 701(j) of
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Title VII160 does not require employers to violate seniority rights set forth in collective bargaining
agreements. In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,161 the Supreme Court extended this rule to nonbargained seniority plans. “[I]t would not be reasonable in the run of cases that the assignment in
question trump the rules of a seniority system. To the contrary, it will ordinarily be unreasonable
for the [disabled claimant’s requested] assignment to prevail.”162
The Court has thus established a presumption that accommodations that would
necessitate exceptions to even unilaterally-adopted employer seniority policies would be
considered “unreasonable.” This would be true even where the rights created under the
employer’s system are not legally enforceable.163 Only where claimants can show that employerestablished seniority plans are so changeable that they have not created reasonable seniority
expectations in employees may exceptions to those plans be found “reasonable.” To accomplish
this objective, claimants would have to prove either that the employer has retained the right to
change the plan unilaterally and has exercised this prerogative frequently or the program contains
so many stated exceptions that it would not be unreasonable to allow another for disabled
workers.164
When might otherwise reasonable accommodations be considered inappropriate because
of the “undue hardship” they would impose on business firms? Although Congress was aware of
the fact the Supreme Court in Hardison had indicated that any proposed accommodation for
employee religious convictions under Title VII would constitute an “undue hardship” if it
entailed more than a “de minimis” economic burden,165 it rejected that narrow approach in the
ADA. It chose to create a sliding scale that requires courts to make individualized assessments
considering the impact of proposed accommodations on particular firms and facilities.166 Courts

41
must evaluate the nature and cost of proposed accommodations measured against the overall
financial resources of the facility involved and of the overall covered entity, the type of operation
and the number of people employed at the facility in question, and the impact of the suggested
accommodation on operations at that facility.
More prosperous firms will be obliged to spend greater amounts of money before
proposed accommodations may be found to constitute “undue hardships.” While a small
company may not have to hire a personal reader for a blind employee, a larger entity may be
expected to do so. Employer hardship claims must also consider the actual impact of the
suggested accommodation on the facility involved. Are there sufficient workers to allow nonessential job functions to be reassigned to others? Could coworkers assist disabled employees
with their performance of particular job tasks? Courts must carefully analyze these types of
inquiries to determine whether proposed accommodations would impose undue hardships on
specific firms.
Even if ADA claimants are able to demonstrate that they possess physical or mental
impairments that are sufficiently limiting to bring them within the judicially-narrowed scope of
ADA coverage and they establish that, with or without accommodations, they could perform the
essential functions of the jobs they seek, they will not necessarily prevail. Unlike Section 503 of
the Rehabilitation Act which requires federal contractors to “take affirmative action to employ
and advance in employment qualified individuals with disabilities,”167 the operative section of the
ADA merely prohibits discrimination against qualified disabled persons because of their
impairments.168 It is thus clear that the ADA does not require employers to provide disabled job
candidates with preferential treatment – except to the limited extent covered entities are obliged
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to provide disabled people with reasonable accommodations where available.169 The ADA thus
allows employers to make comparative assessments among qualified candidates – even if one or
more candidates are disabled – and to prefer the more qualified individuals.170 In the absence of
proof that employers have impermissibly considered the impairments of the disabled candidates,
those individuals would be unable to successfully prosecute ADA claims against the firms that
selected non-disabled persons they considered more qualified. The Supreme Court’s apparent
fear that the ADA could, if not judicially constrained, undermine the merit principles underlying
the American capitalist system are thus completely unfounded.
V. CONCLUSION
The enactment of the ADA in 1990 seemed to extend broad employment discrimination
protection to individuals with disabling conditions or records of impairments, or who are
regarded as disabled. Congress recognized that many Americans are actually disabled, while
many more persons with non-disabling conditions are adversely affected by misperceptions and
ignorant stereotypes regarding impaired people. The Supreme Court apparently believes that the
discrimination protections created by the ADA are unduly expansive. It has thus chosen to
interpret the applicable ADA provisions in ways that severely restrict statutory coverage. The
Court has inexplicably refused to formally acknowledge that working constitutes a major life
activity, despite the inclusion of working in EEOC regulations and the fact that Title I of the
ADA protects the employment rights of disabled individuals. The Court has further rejected
administrative regulations mandating that the impact of medical impairments be determined in
their uncorrected or unmitigated state.
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Where the ability of disabled claimants to work has been in issue, the Court has required
them to prove that their impairments substantially limit their capacity to perform a wide range of
jobs, not just the ones they have been performing. Even significantly limited persons have been
found non-disabled. The Court has created the Sutton paradox: Only severely limited individuals
may establish that they are disabled under the Act, and if they succeed, their limitations are likely
to render them unqualified for the positions they seek.
The Supreme Court has also narrowed the scope of the “regarded as” prong of the
disability definition. It is not sufficient that employers rely upon misperceptions or ignorant
stereotypes to disqualify candidates who could perform the requisite job tasks. Adversely
affected claimants are only entitled to statutory protection if they can demonstrate that the firms
thought their impairments were substantially limiting, even though they were not, or believed
that they had conditions that would have been substantially limiting if they actually had those
impairments. This interpretation continues to deny employment to qualified disabled people
based on the very stereotypes and misperceptions Congress hoped to eradicate through its
enactment of the ADA.
The Supreme Court has ignored the fact that many disabled individuals may work
effectively with minimal accommodations. It has also forgotten that the employment sections of
the ADA do not require employers to prefer impaired candidates over more qualified nonimpaired candidates. The operative provisions merely prohibit discrimination because of
disabling conditions. Even if more expansive ADA coverage were available, covered firms could
continue to hire and retain the most qualified persons.
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